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Most experimental studies of decision-making have speciﬁcally examined situations in
which a single less-predictable correct answer exists (externally guided decision-making
under uncertainty). Along with such externally guided decision-making, there are instances
of decision-making in which no correct answer based on external circumstances is avail-
able for the subject (internally guided decision-making). Such decisions are usually made
in the context of moral decision-making as well as in preference judgment, where the
answer depends on the subject’s own, i.e., internal, preferences rather than on external,
i.e., circumstantial, criteria. The neuronal and psychological mechanisms that allow guid-
ance of decisions based on more internally oriented criteria in the absence of external
ones remain unclear.This study was undertaken to compare decision-making of these two
kinds empirically and theoretically. First, we reviewed studies of decision-making to clar-
ify experimental–operational differences between externally guided and internally guided
decision-making. Second, using multi-level kernel density analysis, a whole-brain-based
quantitative meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies was performed. Our meta-analysis
revealed that the neural network used predominantly for internally guided decision-making
differs from that for externally guided decision-making under uncertainty. This result sug-
gests that studying only externally guided decision-making under uncertainty is insufﬁ-
cient to account for decision-making processes in the brain. Finally, based on the review
and results of the meta-analysis, we discuss the differences and relations between
decision-making of these two types in terms of their operational, neuronal, and theoretical
characteristics.
Keywords: preference, moral judgment, default-mode network, conflict, medial prefrontal cortex, social situation,
resting state, fMRI
INTRODUCTION
How the human brain predisposes us to make certain choices
while not making others is an important question that is often
explored in current neuroscience (Bechara et al., 2000; O’Doherty,
2004, 2007; Sanfey et al., 2006; Volz et al., 2006; Wallis, 2007;
Platt and Huettel, 2008; Rangel et al., 2008; Rilling et al., 2008b;
Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008; Sanfey and Chang, 2008; Vorhold,
2008; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010; Ohira et al., 2010). Most
experimental studies of decision-making have addressed situa-
tions in which one particular more or less-predictable answer
is available. Although such studies particularly addressing low-
predictability include uncertainty related to an answer (Platt and
Huettel, 2008; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008), they nevertheless
presuppose a particular correct answer based on the external cir-
cumstances. One might consequently want to speak of externally
guided decision-making in such a case.
In addition to such externally guided decision-making,
instances of decision-making do exist for which there is no cor-
rect answer available for a subject based on external circumstances
(Goldberg and Podell, 1999, 2000; Lieberman and Eisenberger,
2005; Volz et al., 2006; Nakao et al., 2009b). Such decisions are
usually made in the context of moral decision-making (e.g., Moll
et al., 2006; Greene and Paxton, 2009) as well as in the context
of preference judgment (Paulus and Frank, 2003; Johnson et al.,
2005; Nakao et al., 2009a, 2010a,c), where the answer depends on
the subject’s own, i.e., internal, preferences rather than on exter-
nal, i.e., circumstantial, criteria. One might consecutively want
to speak of internally guided decision-making as distinguished
from externally guided decision-making. Although subjects can
drawon their representationof circumstantial criteria in externally
guideddecision-making,howandonwhat they canbase their deci-
sion in internally guided decision-making remains unclear. More
speciﬁcally, the neuronal andpsychologicalmechanisms that guide
decisions based on more internally oriented internal criteria in the
absence of external ones remain unclear.
This study compares externally and internally guided decision-
making in both respects: empirically and theoretically. First, we
review the decision-making literature to clarify conceptual and
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operational differences between externally and internally guided
decision-making. Regarding externally guided decision-making,
we review reports of studies that have investigated the effect of
a situation in which an objectively correct answer is difﬁcult to
predict (i.e., uncertain situation) because of insufﬁcient informa-
tion to make a judgment (e.g., probabilistic outcome). We also
review the literature related to neuroeconomic studies using tasks
in which the outcome is varied (or believed to be varied) by the
other people’s decisions. For internally guided decision-making,
we review reports of studies of decision-making for which no cor-
rect answer exists, meaning that none of the stimuli or presented
options is regarded as the only objectively correct answer.
Second, we compare externally and internally guided decision-
making with regard to their recruitment of regions. For that we
conducted ameta-analysis of previous neuroimaging studies using
the multi-level kernel density analysis (MKDA) approach (Wager
et al., 2007, 2009). Finally, based on the review of relating arti-
cles and results of the meta-analysis, we discuss the differences
and commonalities between decision-making of these two kinds.
We also discuss the possible directions to advance the future
investigation, especially that of internally guided decision-making.
REVIEW OF STUDIES OF DECISION-MAKING
EXTERNALLY GUIDED DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Operational characteristics of externally guided decision-making
under uncertainty
Most experimental studies of decision-making have examined sit-
uations in which only one less-predictable correct answer exists.
With low-predictability, a low probability of reward or punish-
ment can be associatedwith a stimulus, action, and/or outcome. In
such cases, decision-making can be characterized by“uncertainty.”
Platt and Huettel (2008) deﬁne the concept of uncertainty as the
psychological state in which a decision maker lacks knowledge
about what outcome will follow from either choice in decision-
making. Experimentally, uncertainty has been operationalized as
low-predictability using a probabilistic outcome (Volz et al., 2003,
2004, 2005; Delgado et al., 2005b; Knutson et al., 2005; Huettel,
2006; Tobler et al., 2007; Chandrasekhar et al., 2008; Preuschoff
et al., 2008; Abler et al., 2009) or by a perceptual difﬁculty to
judge (Heekeren et al., 2004; Grinband et al., 2006; Callan et al.,
2009). Despite the low-predictability, these experimental situa-
tions subsume that one of the possible answers is correct. In these
situations, participants must adjust their decision to comply with
the externally deﬁned sole correct answer.
For example, Volz et al. (2003) manipulated low-predictability
by the probabilistic outcome. They examined brain activity during
participants’ prediction of which of the two concurrently pre-
sented visual stimuli would win. Each of the pairings of ﬁgures was
associated systematically with a particular probability of winning
from 60 to 100% (e.g., B wins against C with a mean probability of
60%). In their experiment, participants were never given explicit
information about these probabilities.
As the manipulation of low-predictability, Hsu et al. (2005)
manipulated the predictability of the probabilities of differ-
ent outcomes. They compared neural substrates of decision-
making under risk (low-predictability outcomes with predictable
probabilities) and ambiguity (low-predictability outcomes with
unpredictable probabilities) which are two conditions in which
the consequences of possible outcomes have low-predictability.
Not only the probabilistic outcome, perceptual difﬁculty to
judge is also used to manipulate uncertainty (Heekeren et al.,
2004; Grinband et al., 2006; Callan et al., 2009; Banko et al., 2011).
For example, Heekeren et al. (2004) used face and house stim-
uli to which were added several levels of noise to manipulate
the amount of sensory evidence in the stimuli. Participants were
asked to decide whether a presented image was a face or a house.
Although an objectively correct answer was presented, it was difﬁ-
cult to predict which judgment (house or face) was correct for the
stimulus during simultaneous presentation of noise.
Results of these neuroimaging reports using probabilistic out-
come and perceptual difﬁculty have typically shown increased
activity within the dorsal part of the medial prefrontal cortex
(DMPFC; Volz et al., 2003, 2004; Hsu et al., 2005; Knutson et al.,
2005; Grinband et al., 2006; Krain et al., 2006; Callan et al., 2009;
Mohr et al., 2010a), lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC; Volz et al.,
2003, 2004; Heekeren et al., 2004; Hsu et al., 2005; Krain et al.,
2006; Abler et al., 2009; Callan et al., 2009), orbitofrontal cortex
(Hsu et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2007; Abler et al., 2009), insula
(Volz et al., 2003, 2004; Heekeren et al., 2004; Knutson et al., 2005;
Grinband et al., 2006; Krain et al., 2006; Callan et al., 2009; Mohr
et al., 2010a), and thalamus (Volz et al., 2003; Heekeren et al., 2004;
Grinband et al., 2006; Krain et al., 2006; Callan et al., 2009; Mohr
et al., 2010a).
Theoretical accounting for externally guided decision-making
under uncertainty
The process of externally guided decision-making has generally
been interpreted in the context of a reinforcement learning (RL)
model. In that model, the expected value (i.e., the magnitude of
outcome times the probability of outcome) biases the decision; the
expected value is modiﬁed based on the prediction error (i.e., dis-
crepancies between expected and actual rewards; e.g., O’Doherty
et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2006; Yoshida and Ishii,
2006; Behrens et al., 2007; Cohen, 2007; Boorman et al., 2009;
Glascher et al., 2009; Wunderlich et al., 2009).
Corresponding neural substrates to this model and related con-
cepts have well been identiﬁed. The expected value is typically
processed within the orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, ventral stria-
tum, and insula. Prediction error is related to the ventral striatum
and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC;Tanaka et al., 2004;
Daw et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2006; Cohen, 2007; O’Doherty, 2007;
Tom et al., 2007; Rolls et al., 2008;Glascher et al., 2009;Wunderlich
et al., 2009, 2011).
Hampton et al. (2006) reported results suggesting an impor-
tant limitation of the RL model. They sought to ascertain whether
the use of stored knowledge of the task structure guides choice or
whether learned values guide choice without assuming a higher-
order structure, as in the standard RL model. A computational
model of standard RL model and another model that exploits
knowledge of a task structure for a probabilistic reversal learn-
ing task (i.e., when one action is “good” the other is “bad” and
vice versa, as well as the rule that after a time the contingencies will
reverse; structure-based model) were then constructed and ﬁtted
to both the behavioral and fMRI data.
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The results revealed that neural activity in the ventral region of
MPFC (VMPFC), the orbitofrontal cortex and the posterior dor-
sal amygdala were more consistent with the expected reward signal
from a structure-based model than with that from an RL model.
Their results imply that the standard RL model is not always
appropriate for the analysis of decision-making in the human
brain. The limitation of the standard RL model was also pointed
out by other studies (Daw et al., 2006; Hampton et al., 2008;
Pearson et al., 2011).
Taken together, externally guided decision-making under
uncertainty has been investigated mainly using a task with a prob-
abilistic outcome or stimuli with perceptually difﬁcult judging.
Although the RL model has generally been used to interpret exter-
nally guided decision-making, it is also pointed out that the model
cannot fully explain the brain functions for externally guided
decision-making under uncertainty.
EXTERNALLY GUIDED DECISION-MAKING IN A SOCIAL SITUATION
Operational characteristics of externally guided decision-making in
a social situation
In addition to the probabilistic outcome and perceptual difﬁculty,
an outcome that is varied (or believed to be varied) by other
people’s decisions has been used in externally guided decision-
making (e.g., trust game and prisoner’s dilemma game; Rilling
et al., 2002, 2004, 2008a; Delgado et al., 2005b; Elliott et al., 2006;
Sanfey, 2007; Frith and Singer, 2008; McCabe and Castel, 2008;
Assaf et al., 2009; Wischniewski et al., 2009; Yoshida et al., 2010).
Despite low-predictability on a social basis, experimental situa-
tions include the presumption that one of the possible answers
is correct, and participants are required to adjust their choices
to comply with an externally deﬁned single correct answer. For
that, one might consequently want to categorize tasks of these
kinds, called neuroeconomic tasks, as involving externally guided
decision-making.
The study by Gallagher et al. (2002) is a good example of
an externally guided decision-making in a social situation. They
studied brain activation in humans who played the game rock–
scissors–paper against a human or a computer. The play of the
“human” or the “computer” did not actually differ: they were
random sequences.
In their experiment, greater activity was visible in the pregen-
ual ACC (pACC) and MPFC when participants believed they were
playing against a human as opposed to a computer. Similar obser-
vations have been obtained using neuroeconomic tasks of other
kinds (prisoner’s dilemma game, Rilling et al., 2004; guessing task,
Elliott et al., 2006; domino game, Assaf et al., 2009; and a beauty
contest game, Coricelli and Nagel, 2009).
Theoretical accounts for externally guided decision-making in a
social situation
The control conditions of these experiments were non-social low-
predictability decision-making (e.g., random sequences of out-
comes),meaning that the differences between conditions were not
uncertainty itself but were differences in the stance of the partic-
ipants (i.e., playing against a person, or against a computer). For
that reason, the observed brain activities when participants believe
they are playing against another person compared to the control
task have been inferred as reﬂecting the process of thinking about
the mental state of that person (mentalizing; Frith and Frith, 1999;
Frith and Singer, 2008).
Hampton et al. (2008) presented evidence that mentalizing
has the function of guiding decision-making during game perfor-
mance. They scanned human participants using fMRI while they
played a repetitive inspection game in which employees decide
whether to work or shirk at each trial and an employer decides
whether or not to inspect the work area. In addition to a simple
RL model, the following two computational models were used to
analyze the behavioral and fMRI data: a ﬁctitious model, which
exploits prediction of the opponent’s next actions considering
the history of prior actions by the opponent; and an inﬂuence
model, which exploits not only tracking of the opponent’s actions
but which also incorporates knowledge of how one’s own actions
inﬂuence the opponent’s strategy.
As a result, the inﬂuence model provided a better ﬁt to par-
ticipants’ behavior than did either the ﬁctitious model or the RL
model. Regarding brain activity, results show that the expected
reward signal from the inﬂuence model provides a better account
of the neural data in MPFC than does that from a simple RL
model. These results suggest that mentalizing engaged in MPFC
affects reward prediction, and that it might be used to guide choice
during game performance.
Collectively, these neuroeconomic researchers have examined
the effects of social interaction in externally guided decision-
making. Even if the outcome varied by other people’s decisions,
a correct answer is determined externally, and participants are
required to predict which option produces a better outcome in
each trial. Different from the externally guided decision-making
under uncertainty, however, the results from these neuroeconomic
studies do not reﬂect uncertainty itself, but instead reﬂect the
effects of social interaction. These reports described that signals in
MPFC related to mentalizing have a function of biasing decision-
making in a social situation to choose an externally determined
correct option.
INTERNALLY GUIDED DECISION-MAKING
Operational characteristics of internally guided decision-making
Uncertainty and social situations still presuppose some externally
determined single correct answer, although that answer is chosen
with low-predictability. How about the complete absence of one
correct answer based on external circumstances, even when given
no low-predictability choices? In such cases, we cannot rely on an
externally determined objectively correct answer to choose and to
regulate one’s own behavior, and the answer and its correctness
depends on one’s own, i.e., internal, preferences rather than on
circumstantial, i.e., external, criteria (Goldberg and Podell, 1999,
2000; Lieberman and Eisenberger, 2005; Volz et al., 2006; Nakao
et al., 2009b).
Such situations are apparent in the context of moral decision-
making (Moll et al., 2001, 2002, 2006; Zysset et al., 2002, 2003;
Heekeren et al., 2003, 2005; Greene et al., 2004; Paulus and Frank,
2006; Schaich Borg et al., 2006; Greene and Paxton, 2009; Cikara
et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2010; Sommer et al., 2010; Caspers et al.,
2011; Kahane et al., 2011; Schleim et al., 2011). For instance, when
requiring participants to decide about giving money to either
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themselves or to a charitable organization, the study by Moll et al.
(2006) does not presume that either of the two options is correct.
Here, the outcome indicating that the participant receives money
(the good outcome in the case of the externally guided decision-
making) is not necessarily a correct answer because, taking a more
moral stance, the donation to the charitable organization might
be regarded as the correct answer. While adopting the subject’s
viewpoint and that person’s own ﬁnancial interests, receiving the
money (rather than giving it to charity) would be regarded as
the correct answer. This choice entails that the decision (whether
participant choose their behavior based on self-interest or moral)
depends on criteria employed by the participant. Results demon-
strate that costly decisions (choosing costly donation or costly
opposition) were associated more closely with activation of the
MPFC than pure reward decisions were.
A similar ﬁnding was also reported by Greene and Paxton
(2009). They examined neural activity involved in participants’
decisions of whether to tell the truth or lie when reporting their
success at predicting the outcome of coin ﬂips. In this task, if par-
ticipants report their success at the prediction, then they win the
amount of money shown. In contrast, if they report their failure at
the prediction, they lose the amount of money shown. In this task,
lying to get themoney is not a good choice fromamoral viewpoint.
Nevertheless, reporting the successful prediction is a good choice
for obtaining money even if it is based on lying. Consequently,
neither of the choices was the correct answer. The authors found
DMPFC, LPFC, and right parietal lobe activity when dishonest
people chose to tell the truth instead of lying for proﬁt.
In addition to such moral decision-making, preference judg-
ments are included in internally guided decision-making. In the
preference judgment task,participants are required tomake a deci-
sion based on personal criteria; the judgment is not based on exter-
nal criteria. Preference judgments of many kinds have been used
in previous studies: preference judgment for food (Arana et al.,
2003; Paulus and Frank, 2003; Hare et al., 2009; Piech et al., 2009;
Linder et al., 2010), products (Knutson et al., 2007, 2008), brands
(Santos et al., 2011), faces (Kim et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010),
holiday options (Chaudhry et al., 2009), paintings (Jarcho et al.,
2011), political beliefs (Zamboni et al., 2009), occupations (Nakao
et al., 2009a, 2010c), task types (Forstmann et al., 2006), agencies
of choice (Forstmann et al., 2008), shapes (Jacobsen et al., 2006),
and colors (Goldberg and Podell, 1999, 2000; Johnson et al., 2005).
For instance, Paulus and Frank (2003) investigated brain activ-
ity during preference judgment for soft drinks. They presented
two pictures of a soft drink in each trial. In preference judgment
tasks, participants were asked to judge which drink they would
like better. In the control task (visual discrimination task), stimuli
were the same picture set with the preference judgment task. Then
they were asked to identify which soft drink was in a bottle, a can,
or a carton: the control task has an objective correct answer with
no uncertain situation.
Analogously, Nakao et al. (2009a) used an occupational choice
task (e.g., Which occupation do you think you could do better? –
dancer or chemist) without an objectively correct answer and a
word-length task (e.g., Which word is longer? – dentist or come-
dian) that has one certain correct answer. In the occupational
choice task,participantswere clearly instructed that there is neither
an objectively correct answer nor a contingent outcome with each
decision.
These preference judgment tasks typically show increased activ-
ity within the pACC, VMPFC, and posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC) compared with the control task, which is the externally
guided decision-making with a certain correct answer.
In sum, internally guided decision-making has been inves-
tigated in moral judgment and preference judgment studies.
When compared with the judgment task with a clear objec-
tive correct answer, several neural substrates’ increased activity
has been observed during internally guided decision-making.
Although MPFC seems to be observed consistently in internally
guided decision-making (Nakao et al., 2009b, 2010b), no pre-
vious report has described examination of which brain regions
were activated consistently among internally guided decision-
making studies using a quantitative approach. Furthermore, no
report has described a study that has investigated the differ-
ences and similarities of neural substrates between the two kinds
of decision-making representing real-life decision-making (i.e.,
internally guided decision-making and externally guided decision-
making under uncertainty). For that purpose, we conducted the
exploratory meta-analysis described hereinafter.
METHOD
STUDY SELECTION
Research papers were found primarily by searching the PubMed
database (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/) using the key-
words (“fMRI” or “functional magnetic resonance imaging”
or “PET” or “positron emission tomography”) and (“decision-
making”) and (“uncertain” or “uncertainty” or “probability” or
“probabilistic” or “difﬁcult” or “difﬁculty” or “neuroeconomic”
or “economic” or “social” or “game” or “moral” or “morality” or
“ethic” or “ethical” or “preference” or “prefer” or “belief” or “free”
or “evaluation”) As additional references, we added several reports
from the reference lists of the relevant articles to ensure the inclu-
sion of all relevant studies ﬁtting our criteria. The reference lists of
several review articles were also inspected (Frith and Frith, 1999;
Bechara et al., 2000; Rolls, 2000, 2004; Greene and Haidt, 2002;
Casebeer, 2003; Greene, 2003; Fellows, 2004; Glimcher and Rusti-
chini, 2004; O’Doherty, 2004, 2007; Sanfey and Cohen, 2004; Moll
et al., 2005; Roberts, 2006; Sanfey et al., 2006; Volz et al., 2006;
Coricelli et al., 2007; Sanfey, 2007; Wallis, 2007; Frith and Singer,
2008; Heekeren et al., 2008; Lee, 2008; Platt and Huettel, 2008;
Rangel et al., 2008; Rilling et al., 2008b; Rolls and Grabenhorst,
2008; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008; Sanfey and Chang, 2008;
Vorhold, 2008; Knabb et al., 2009; Volz and von Cramon, 2009;
Wischniewski et al., 2009; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010; Mohr
et al., 2010a,b; Nakao et al., 2010b; Rangel and Hare, 2010; Liu
et al., 2011).
In the relevant literature, we included reports of studies of
decision-making of the following kinds (see also Table 1). (1)
Brain activity coordinates fromhealthyparticipantswere included.
Those of neurological or psychiatric patients and those using
medications were not included. (2) Only reports describing all
the signiﬁcant activation foci as 3D coordinates (x, y, z) in the
space of the MNI template or the atlas of Talairach and Tournoux
were included; those of studies based on region of interest (ROI)
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Table 1 | Summary of inclusion and exclusion criteria for meta-analysis
Inclusion Exclusion
For all decision-
making studies
• Brain activity coordinates from healthy participants • Brain activity coordinates from neurological or
psychiatric patients and those using medication
• Reports describing all signiﬁcant activation foci as 3D coordinates (x, y, z)
in the space of the MNI template or the atlas of Talairach andTournoux
• Studies based on region of interest (ROI) analysis
• Data related to brain activity revealed by task comparison or image
subtraction methods, parametric designs, or brain-behavioral correction
• Data related to changes in functional or effective
connectivity
• Activation data • Deactivation data
• Studies using a task requiring a participant to make a decision • Studies using a task requiring no participant to make
a decision
Externally guided
decision-making
• Studies using a task for which one choice is associated with a better
outcome (e.g. reward) than others, indicating that the choice is correct
• Studies using a computational model that is not
applicable to internally guided decision-making to
analyze fMRI data
• Studies using a task for which no feedback was presented but for which
the task has one objective correct answer and participants had to try to
respond correctly
• Neural activations speciﬁc to the feedback epoch
and prediction error
Under uncertainty • Studies investigating the effect of a situation in which it is difﬁcult to
predict a correct answer because of insufﬁcient information to judge
(e.g., low probability of reward>high probability of reward)
• Contrasts investigating the effect of risk or expected
value in the case that these were manipulated not
only by the probability of an outcome but also by
the amount of the outcome
In social situation • Reports of studies investigating a brain region that is sensitive to varied
outcomes by other people’s decisions (e.g., Low predictable
(social)>Low predictable (nonsocial))
• Contrasts investigating the effect from which
different decisions were excluded (e.g., share vs.
keep decisions in a trust game)
Internally guided
decision-making
• Studies using tasks in which no stimulus or option was regarded as
correct
• Contrasts comparing internally guided
decision-making of different kinds
• Studies investigating differences of decision-making for problems with no
correct answer from decision-making for problems with one correct
answer
• Contrasts comparing different decisions in internally
guided decision-making
• Study using a task which clearly requires
participants to make a judgment based on social
criteria instead of a participant’s own criteria
analysis were excluded. (3) Data related to brain activity revealed
by task comparison or image-subtraction methods, paramet-
ric designs, or brain-behavioral correction were included. Data
related to changes in functional or effective connectivity were
excluded. (4) Only activation data were included in the relevant
analysis; deactivation data were not considered. (5) A study was
regarded as decision-making-related if it necessitated that a partic-
ipant make a decision. We therefore excluded all studies in which
participants were not required to make a decision.
In the review part of this paper, we cited possible related
articles. For our meta-analysis, however, we selected the articles
more strictly for comparison between externally and internally
guided decision-making. In numerous externally guided decision-
making studies, psychological/computational models (e.g., RL
model) and related concepts (e.g., expected value and predic-
tion error) have been used broadly (e.g., Hampton et al., 2006;
Cohen, 2007). Although these models and concepts presuppose
the presence of outcomes, internally guided decision-making did
not presuppose the presence of an outcome (i.e., an objectively
correct answer): these models and concepts used in externally
guided decision-making were not applicable to internally guided
decision-making. This difference makes it difﬁcult to use the
results obtainedusingmodels and concepts of these kinds for com-
parisons between externally guided decision-making and inter-
nally guided decision-making. For that reason, in the analyses
presentedherein,wedidnot include reports of studies of externally
guided decision-making based on these models and concepts. We
chose externally guided decision-making studies that focused on
the effect from the situation with uncertainty or with social inter-
action (e.g., low-predictability vs. high-predictability for externally
guided decision-making under uncertainty; low-predictability in
a social situation vs. low-predictability in a non-social situation
for externally guided decision-making in a social situation).
Similarly, as representative of internally guided decision-
making, we chose studies which speciﬁcally addressed the effect
from a situation without an externally determined correct answer
(no objective correct answer vs. a single objective correct answer).
See the following and Table 1 for details related to inclusion
and exclusion criteria.
Externally guided decision-making
As externally guided decision-making studies, we included reports
of studies using a task in which one choice was associated with
a better outcome (e.g., reward) than others, indicating that the
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choice is correct. We also included studies using a task in which
no feedback was presented, but for which the task has one
objective correct answer and participants had to try to respond
correctly (e.g., Heekeren et al., 2004; Hsu et al., 2005; Callan
et al., 2009; Banko et al., 2011). For comparison with internally
guided decision-making, we excluded reports of studies using a
computational model that is not applicable to internally guided
decision-making to analyze the fMRI data (e.g., RL model with
incorporating the effect of the situation of low-predictability (task
structure; Hampton et al., 2006, see review part for the details).We
excluded neural activations that are speciﬁc to the feedback epoch
and prediction error (e.g., Wittmann et al., 2008), which cannot
be compared with internally guided decision-making.
Externally guided decision-making under uncertainty. As
reports of studies of externally guided decision-making under
uncertainty we included those of studies which investigated the
effect of a situation in which it is difﬁcult to predict a correct
answer because of the insufﬁcient information for judgment (e.g.,
low probability of reward> high probability of reward). Contrasts
that investigated the effect of risk (e.g., Cohen, 2007; Xue et al.,
2009; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010) or expected value (e.g., Rolls
et al., 2008; Symmonds et al., 2010;Wu et al., 2011b) were excluded
in cases where these were manipulated not only by the probability
of outcome but also by the amount of outcome.We excluded them
because ourmain interest here is not the effect of the amount of the
outcome but the effect from a low-predictability (i.e., uncertain)
situation (for results of ameta-analysis of reward/outcome-related
brain regions, see Liu et al., 2011; for results of meta-analysis of
risk-related brain regions, see Mohr et al., 2010a).
Externally guided decision-making in a social situation. With
studies of externally guided decision-making in a social situation,
we included reports of studies that investigated a brain region
that is sensitive to the varied outcome by other people’s deci-
sions [e.g., low-predictability (social)> low-predictability (non-
social)]. Contrasts that investigated the effects from different
decisions were excluded (e.g., share vs. keep decisions in a trust
game as described by Delgado et al., 2005a).
Internally guided decision-making
For studies of internally guided decision-making, we included
studies using tasks in which no stimulus or option was regarded
as correct. Studies investigating differences of decision-making
for problems with no correct answer from decision-making for
problems with one correct answer were included. We excluded
the contrasts which compared different kinds of internally guided
decision-making (e.g., Schaich Borg et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2009;
Sommer et al., 2010).We also didnot include contrastswhich com-
pared different decisions in the internally guided decision-making
(e.g., Sanfey et al., 2003; Greene et al., 2004). We excluded a study
using a task that clearly requires participants to make judgments
based on social criteria instead of the participants’ own criteria
(Prehn et al., 2008).
ANALYSIS TO EVALUATE THE BALANCE BETWEEN SELECTED STUDIES
To evaluate stimulus-speciﬁc effects in the comparison between
externally and internally guided decision-making, the stimulus
types (verbal/non-verbal or visual/auditory) of these studies were
described respectively for these studies of decision-making (see
Table A1 in Appendix). Chi-square tests or Fisher’s exact tests
were conducted to examine whether the constitution of studies
relying upon stimuli of different types differs between externally
and internally guided decision-making. Because MKDA results
are also affected by the sample size and the quality of the statistical
analysis of the original studies, studies in these categories were also
compared relative to their sample size and the false discovery rate
correction they adopted.
Furthermore, to assess the inﬂuence of difﬁculty of the exper-
imental tasks on the meta-analysis, the response time differences
between the compared conditions were calculated (e.g., uncer-
tain – control conditions, preference judgment – control condi-
tion; see Table A1 in Appendix). In cases where parametric design
(e.g., decreasing predictability, 50%> 69%> 100%) was used, we
took the average of all the differences between close conditions
(e.g., average between 50–69 and 69–100%). In several studies, the
exact differences of reaction times were not available, although
the results of statistical analyses were available. To take account
of these cases, we conducted a Chi-square test using data showing
whether the reaction times of the experimental condition (uncer-
tain or internally guided) were signiﬁcantly longer than those of
the control condition or not.
MULTI-LEVEL KERNEL DENSITY ANALYSIS
We conducted MKDA (Wager et al., 2007, 2009), a coordinate-
based meta-analysis method, for peak coordinates in a particular
statistical contrast map (SCM) of the selected decision-making
studies. In this method, the probability of activation of a given
voxel in the brain across the studies is estimated. The null hypoth-
esis is a random distribution of peak coordinates within each
comparison in the standard brain. The well-established MKDA
approach (Wager et al., 2007, 2009) has been used in several stud-
ies (Etkin and Wager, 2007; Kober et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2010;
Fan et al., 2011; Qin and Northoff, 2011). The MKDA method
was selected because of its several important advantages over the
meta-analysis approaches used previously (ALE, KDA). First, the
previousmethods analyzed thepeak coordinates froma set of stud-
ies without considering the nesting of peaks within contrasts. Such
procedures produce results that are biased by numerous peak coor-
dinates reported in a single study. In theMKDAapproach,multiple
peaks are nested within a contrast, and multiple contrasts are
nestedwithin a study. Thismethod enables true assessment of con-
sistency across studies. A second advantage is that MKDA allows
the weighting of contrasts by study sample size and by the quality
of analyses based on random or ﬁxed-effects designs used in the
original study. These weights allow for studies with more numer-
ous participants. Alternatively, randomeffects designs are assigned
greaterweight to exertmore inﬂuence on themeta-analytic results.
Finally, the results from MKDA provide a straightforward inter-
pretation as a weighted proportion of activated contrasts within a
kernel around (typically 10 mm of) each voxel (Kober et al., 2008).
For the present meta-analysis, relevant variables were sample
size, analysis type (ﬁxed or random effects), and coordinates of
peak activation in selected contrast of previous studies. The coor-
dinates in Talairach space were translated into MNI space. The
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coordinates from the one contrast were used to build one spe-
cial SCM, and the coordinates from each SCM were convolved
with a spherical kernel of 10 mm radius. The voxels within 10 mm
around the coordinate were thresholded at a maximum value of 1.
The SCM were then weighted by the sample size and the analysis
type (ﬁxed or random effects). The weight for each contrast was
the square root of the sample size, multiplied by an adjustment
weight for the analysis type (1 for the resulted from a random-
effect analysis; 0.75 for the results from a ﬁxed-effects analysis).
We did not consider the Z -scores of each study because they are
not provided by all studies we selected. In addition, their inclusion
has been shown to affect the replicability of activation across stud-
ies, thereby rendering interpretation more difﬁcult (Kober et al.,
2008; Wager et al., 2009). A statistical threshold was established
through 5000 iterations of a Monte Carlo procedure. The results
were reported as an MKDA statistic map at a height threshold
of familywise error rate (FWE) corrected at p < 0.05, a strin-
gent threshold of FWE corrected for spatial extent at p< 0.05
with primary thresholds of uncorrected p < 0.001, and a medium
threshold of FWE corrected for spatial extent at p< 0.05 with
primary thresholds of uncorrected p< 0.01.
To compare the differences and similarities between externally
and internally guided decision-making, we conducted the meta-
analysis in two steps. First, we conducted the meta-analysis for
decision-making of each kind [i.e., externally guided decision-
making (uncertainty), externally guided decision-making (social),
and internally guided decision-making]: separate MKDA statis-
tic maps were constructed for decision-making of each kind.
Two of these maps were mounted on the same standard brain
to indicate the distinctive regions involved in these instances
of decision-making. Inclusive masks were applied to determine
the overlap between two of these activation maps (i.e., exter-
nally guided decision-making (uncertainty) and internally guided
decision-making, or externally guided decision-making (social)
and internally guideddecision-making). The overlap analyseswere
conducted using MRIcroN (Rorden, 2007).
Second, we compared the activation of externally guided
decision-making (uncertainty) and internally guided decision-
making by subtraction analysis in MKDA: separate maps con-
structed for decision-making of each of the two types were
subtracted to yield difference maps. The same procedure was
employed in the course of the Monte Carlo randomization to
establish a threshold for signiﬁcant differences. We did not con-
struct difference maps between externally guided decision-making
(social) and internally guided decision-making, or between exter-
nally guided decision-making (social) and externally guided
decision-making (uncertainty) because only six studies were
included for externally guided decision-making (social).
RESULTS
BALANCE BETWEEN THE SELECTED STUDIES FOR EACH
DECISION-MAKING
Of the studies considered, 18 studies (24 contrasts, 205 coor-
dinates, 293 participants in total) were regarded as relevant
for externally guided decision-making (uncertainty), 6 studies
(8 contrasts, 49 coordinates, 86 participants) were included for
externally guided decision-making (social), and 18 studies were
selected for internally guided decision-making (22 contrasts, 143
coordinates, 303 participants; see Table A1 in Appendix). Chi-
square tests show a signiﬁcant difference for the number of
studies among these three categories [χ2(2)= 6.86, p= 0.03].
Post hoc Bonferroni tests (p< 0.05) revealed no signiﬁcant dif-
ference between externally guided decision-making (uncertainty)
and internally guided decision-making. The studies of exter-
nally guided decision-making (social) were fewer than those of
externally guided decision-making (uncertainty) and internally
guided decision-making. Because of the low number of externally
guided decision-making (social), we did not use the dataset for
externally guided decision-making (social) to construct difference
maps [i.e., externally guided decision-making (uncertainty) vs.
externally guided decision-making (social), and externally guided
decision-making (social) vs. internally guided decision-making]
in the following MKDA analysis.
Regarding externally guided decision-making (uncertainty)
and internally guided decision-making, Fisher’s exact test revealed
no signiﬁcant difference related to the stimulus modality (visual
or auditory; p = 1.00). Moreover, no signiﬁcant difference was
found related to the quality of statistics [corrected or uncor-
rected; χ2(1)= 1.78, p= 0.18], and the sample size [t (34)= 0.20,
p= 0.84].No signiﬁcant difference of the sample sizewas observed
even when we included externally guided decision-making [social;
F(2,39)= 0.24, p= 0.79]. A signiﬁcant difference was found
related to the proportion of verbal stimulus and non-verbal stim-
ulus (Fisher’s exact test p< 0.01). Verbal stimuli tended to be
used more in internally guided decision-making; non-verbal stim-
uli were used more in externally guided decision-making under
uncertainty (see Table A1 in Appendix).
Furthermore, to assess the inﬂuence of difﬁculty of the exper-
imental tasks on the meta-analysis, the response time differences
between the compared conditions (e.g., uncertain – control, or
internally guided – control) were calculated. No signiﬁcant dif-
ference of the reaction-time differences was observed between
externally guided decision-making (uncertainty) and internally
guided decision-making [t (24)= 1.18, p= 0.25]. No signiﬁcant
difference was observed even when we included externally guided
decision-making in social situations [F(2,25)= 1.91, p= 0.17].
Consistently, no signiﬁcant difference was found related to the sta-
tistical difference of reaction times (signiﬁcantly longer in exper-
imental condition or not) between externally guided decision-
making (uncertainty) and internally guided decision-making
[χ2(1)= 0.27, p= 0.60].
To assess whether the experimental conditions (uncertain,
social, or internally guided) induced a longer time to make a
decision than the control condition, we compared the reaction-
time differences with 0 (no difference of reaction time between
the conditions) within each type of decision-making. No signif-
icant difference was observed in any type of decision-making
[externally guided (uncertainty), Welch’s t (8)= 0.50, p= 0.63;
externally guided (social), Welch’s t (1)= 1.47, p= 0.38; inter-
nally guided,Welch’s t (16)= 1.31,p= 0.21]. Consistent with these
results, Chi-square tests for the statistical difference of reaction
times (signiﬁcantly longer in experimental condition or not)
revealed no signiﬁcant differences in externally guided [uncer-
tainty,χ2(1)= 1, p= 0.32] and in internally guided [χ2(1)= 0.07,
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p= 0.80]. Because of the small sample size, we were unable to use
Chi-square tests for externally guided decision-making (social).
MKDA RESULTS
Externally guided decision-making (uncertainty) vs. internally
guided decision-making
Meta-analysis results indicated different neural representation
patterns for externally guided decision-making (uncertainty;
Figure 1A) and internally guided decision-making (Figure 1C;
see also Table 2). Figure 2A presents results of statistical overlap
as based on inclusive masking. Regions with signiﬁcant propor-
tions of activation for the externally guided decision-making were
in DMPFC, dorsal LPFC (DLPFC), insula, thalamus, and IPL. For
internally guided decision-making, the clusters in MPFC, pACC,
PCC, and superior temporal gyrus (STG) were revealed. Only the
DMPFC (BA 8) overlapped between decision-making of the two
kinds. Although we refer to the overlapped region as DMPFC
hereinafter, it is noteworthy that the same region (BA8) has been
mentioned also as a part of the supplemental motor area (SMA;
Caria et al., 2011) and pre-SMA (Rubia et al., 2001; Chen et al.,
2010) in several previous studies.
Figure 3 presents results from the two difference maps as
based on their respective contrasts [i.e., externally guided decision-
making (uncertainty)< /> internally guided decision-making].
Although the extensions of the several clusters were restricted, the
direct comparison showed (more or less) similar regions to those
portrayed in Figure 1. Internally guided decision-making showed
larger clusters in mainly medial cortical regions while externally
guided decision-making showed stronger clusters in lateral regions
(see also Table 3).
Externally guided decision-making (social) vs. internally guided
decision-making
Figure 1B presents results of externally guided decision-making
in a social situation. To observe the effect from social compo-
nent included in internally guided decision-making, we mounted
the MKDA results of externally guided decision-making (social)
and internally guided decision-making on the same stereotaxic
standard brain, and indicated the statistical overlaps (Figure 2B.
DMPFC (BA8, 9) overlapped between social and internally guided
decision-making. In contrast, no overlapwas observed in the other
regions observed in internally guided decision-making.
FIGURE 1 | Multi-level kernel density analysis results for (A) externally
guided decision-making under uncertainty, (B) externally guided
decision-making in a social situation, and (C) internally guided
decision-making. Results from the different statistical thresholds are
shown with different colors: cyan, pink, and yellow, a height threshold of
familywise error rate (FWE) corrected at p <0.05; orange, a stringent
threshold of FWE corrected for the spatial extent at p<0.05 with primary
thresholds of uncorrected p <0.001; blue, violet, and red, a medium
threshold of FWE corrected for the spatial extent at p<0.05 with primary
thresholds of uncorrected p<0.01. No clusters were identiﬁed at the
stringent threshold in externally guided decision-making under uncertainty
or in a social situation. DMPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; DLPFC,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; IFG, inferior
frontal gyrus; pACC, perigenual anterior cingulate cortex; PCC, posterior
cingulate cortex; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex.; STG, superior temporal
gyrus.
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Table 2 | MKDA results for decision-making studies of each type.
Type of decision-making Region BA MNI coordinates Voxels Maxstat.
x y z
Externally guided (Uncertainty) Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) 8, 6 2 28 44 149 0.34**
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 9, 8 40 24 38 966 0.23
†
Insula 47 34 20 0 150 0.37**
Thalamus N/A 12 −14 8 77 0.26**
Inferior Parietal Lobule (IPL) 40 48 −54 42 134 0.34**
Externally guided (Social) Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) 9 4 50 22 11 0.48**
9, 8, 6 −4 46 30 1156 0.38†
9 −6 44 36 12 0.48**
Inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) 47 42 22 −18 38 0.5**
Internally guided Medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) 10, 11, 6, 8, 9, 32 −2 50 14 4983 0.21*
Perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (pACC) 32 −10 44 −8 14 0.21**
Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) 31 −4 −56 28 64 0.32**
Superior temporal gyrus (STG) 39 −50 −60 22 64 0.3**
Regions marked ** were signiﬁcant at FWE voxel-level corrected p<0.05 with extent size >10 voxels. Regions marked *were signiﬁcant at FEW extent corrected
p<0.05 at primary voxel thresholds of uncorrected p<0.001. Regions marked †were signiﬁcant at FEW extent corrected p<0.05 at primary voxel thresholds of
uncorrected p<0.01. Regions marked with* and with †were reported if these were additional regions. BA denotes Brodman Area; Maxstat. denotes maximum of
the Z ﬁeld.
FIGURE 2 | Multi-level kernel density analysis results for overlaps (A)
between externally guided decision-making under uncertainty and
internally guided decision-making and (B) between externally guided
decision-making in a social situation and internally guided
decision-making. DMPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex.
DISCUSSION
OPERATIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXTERNALLY AND INTERNALLY
GUIDED DECISION-MAKING
As we described earlier in the review part, experimental–
operational differences existed between externally and internally
guided decision-making. Externally guided decision-making stud-
ies have used the decision-making taskwith a single correct answer
that is less-predictable. In these situations, participants must
adjust their decision to comply with the externally deﬁned sin-
gle correct answer. Uncertainty (i.e., low-predictability) has been
manipulated with a probabilistic outcome or with stimuli that
are perceptually difﬁcult to judge. In studies of externally guided
decision-making in a social situation, an outcome that is varied
(or which was believed to be varied) by other people’s decisions
has been used.
In contrast with such externally guided decision-making, in
internally guided decision-making, no correct answer based on
external circumstances is available for the subject. Studies of such
decision-making have been used for moral judgment and prefer-
ence judgment tasks for which the answer depends on the subject’s
own, i.e., internal, preferences rather than on external, i.e., cir-
cumstantial, criteria (see Figure 4 for a summary of the difference
between externally and internally guided decision-making).
NEURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXTERNALLY AND INTERNALLY
GUIDED DECISION-MAKING
Our meta-analysis indicated that different neural networks were
recruited for externally guided decision-making (uncertainty) and
internally guided decision-making. The DMPFC–DLPFC–insula–
thalamus–IPL network was activated consistently in externally
guided decision-making under uncertainty (see Figures 1A and
3A). This result was consistent with the results of previous meta-
analysis study about risky decision-making (Mohr et al., 2010a),
which conﬁrms that the method used here works properly and
that it produces reliable results.
In internally guided decision-making, MPFC–pACC–PCC–
STG network was activated consistently (see Figure 1C). Even
when we compared externally guided decision-making under
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FIGURE 3 | Multi-level kernel density analysis results from the
difference maps for (A) externally guided decision-making under
uncertainty > internally guided decision, and for (B) internally guided
decision-making > externally guided decision under uncertainty.
Results from the different statistical thresholds are shown with different
colors: cyan, pink, and yellow, a height threshold of familywise error rate
(FWE) corrected at p <0.05; orange, a stringent threshold of FWE
corrected for spatial extent at p<0.05 with primary thresholds of
uncorrected p <0.001; blue, violet, and red, a medium threshold of FWE
corrected for spatial extent at p<0.05 with primary thresholds of
uncorrected p<0.01. No cluster was observed at the stringent threshold
in externally guided decision-making under uncertainty> internally guided
decision-making. DMPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; DLPFC,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; pACC, perigenual
anterior cingulate cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; MPFC, medial
prefrontal cortex; STG, superior temporal gyrus.
Table 3 | MKDA results from the difference map between internally and externally guided decision-making (uncertainty).
Contrasts Region BA MNI coordinates Voxels Maxstat.
x y z
Externally guided (Uncertainty), > internally guided Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) 8 6 26 48 47 0.3**
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 9, 8 40 24 38 1010 0.23
†
Insula 13 36 18 2 17 0.32**
Thalamus N/A 12 −14 8 77 0.26**
Inferior parietal lobule (IPL) 40 46 −52 42 73 0.34**
40 −48 −48 44 849 0.22†
Internally guided, > externally guided (Uncertainty) Medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) 10, 11, 32, 9, 8 −2 52 8 3354 0.2*
Perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (pACC) 11, 32 −8 48 −12 32 0.21**
Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) 31 −4 −56 28 64 0.32**
Superior temporal gyrus (STG) 39 −50 −60 22 65 0.3**
Regions marked ** were signiﬁcant at FWE voxel-level corrected p<0.05 with extent size>10 voxels.
Regions marked *were signiﬁcant at FEW extent corrected p<0.05 at primary voxel thresholds of uncorrected p<0.001.
Regions marked †were signiﬁcant at FEW extent corrected p<0.05 at primary voxel thresholds of uncorrected p<0.01.
Regions marked with* and with †were reported if these were additional regions.
BA denotes Brodman Area; Maxstat. denotes the maximum of the Z ﬁeld.
uncertainty and internally guided decision-making directly, the
same networks remained for each category of decision-making
(see Figure 3B).
The only common region between these two was DMPFC
(Figure 2A), which was broader in comparison of externally
guided decision-making in a social situation and internally guided
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FIGURE 4 | Schematic summary of differences and relations between
externally and internally guided decision-making in terms of operational,
neuronal, and theoretical characteristics. Operational characteristics: clear
differences are apparent between these two types of decision-making related
to the availability of an externally determined correct answer. Neuronal
characteristics: externally guided decision-making under uncertainty is mainly
supported by the task-positive network (DLPFC–insula–thalamus–IPL
network). In contrast, internally guided decision-making is supported mainly
by the task negative, default mode network (DMN). The DMPFC is commonly
activated in decision making of these kinds and has functional relations with
task-positive and task-negative networks. No clear boundary separates
decision making processes of different kinds: each decision-making task can
be located on the continuum. The extent to which the
DLPFC–insula–thalamus–IPL or the VMPFC–pACC–PCC–STG networks
becomes involved would differ depending on the decision-making situation.
Theoretical characteristics: conﬂict-based regulation is expected to have an
important role for internally guided decision-making instead of
outcome-based regulation in the case of externally guided decision-making.
The networks for internally guided decision-making are probably modulated
according to the amount of conﬂict evaluated within dACC.
decision-making (Figure 2B). The VMPFC was, however, limited
to internally guided decision-making, even in that comparison.
This evidence suggests that the activation of VMPFC–pACC–
PCC–STG network was caused neither by uncertainty related to
an externally determined correct answer nor by social interaction.
Our results ﬁrst revealed the neural substrates associated specif-
ically with internally guided decision-making, as distinguished
from the neural substrates associated speciﬁcally with externally
guided decision-making under uncertainty. Externally guided
decision-making under uncertainty is probably insufﬁcient to
account for our decision-making in everyday life.
Balance between the selected studies for externally guided
decision-making under uncertainty and internally guided
decision-making
Before further discussion related to meta-analysis results, the dif-
ference of stimulus type (verbal or non-verbal) used in exter-
nally guided decision-making under uncertainty and in inter-
nally guided decision-making should be explained. Verbal stimuli
tended to be used more in internally guided decision-making;
non-verbal stimuli were used more in externally guided decision-
making under uncertainty (see Table A1 in Appendix).
Based on the following four reasons, however, we conclude
that the regions observed in our meta-analysis results were not
attributable to the difference of stimulus type. First, in every
study included in the present meta-analysis, stimuli of the same
type with experimental conditions were used in control condi-
tions. For that reason, the coordinates from these studies were
not speciﬁc to the stimulus type itself, but were speciﬁc to uncer-
tainty or absence of an objective correct answer. Second, previous
meta-analytical studies of neural substrates for working memory
(Owen et al., 2005) and associative learning (Chein and Schneider,
2005) demonstrated broadly similar activation patterns for verbal
and non-verbal stimuli including the regions observed in exter-
nally guided decision-making under uncertainty. Third, regarding
internally guided decision-making, studies included in our meta-
analysis and which used non-verbal stimuli (Paulus and Frank,
2003; Johnson et al., 2005; Jacobsen et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2010;
Hare et al., 2010) yielded results indicating similar neural sub-
strates with our meta-analysis results. Fourth, although Kobayashi
et al. (2007) observed similar brain regions with internally guided
decision-making by their mentalizing task, no increased activities
within these regions were observed using verbal stimuli compared
to non-verbal stimuli.
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We found no other signiﬁcant difference between externally
and internally guided decision-making with respect to the stim-
ulus modality (visual or auditory), the sample size, the quality
of the statistical analysis (corrected, uncorrected), and differences
of reaction times between the experimental condition (uncertain,
social, or internally guided) and control condition. Moreover, the
reaction times in the experimental conditionwere not signiﬁcantly
longer than those in the control condition in either the exter-
nally guided decision-making under uncertainty or the internally
guided decision-making. Based on these results, we conclude that
the brain region observation results were not attributable to these
factors.
Internally guided decision-making and intrinsic brain activity
In our meta-analysis results, the DMPFC–DLPFC–insula–
thalamus–IPL network was activated consistently in externally
guided decision-making under uncertainty. In contrast, VMPFC–
pACC–PCC–STG network was activated in internally guided
decision-making. This difference is similar to the distinction into
two complementary networks, task-positive networks and task-
negative networks, calleddefault-modenetworks (DMN;Fox et al.,
2005; Broyd et al., 2009; Hampson et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2010;
Northoff et al., 2010;Wuet al., 2011a). The task-positive network is
known to be activated consistently during goal-directed/externally
oriented cognitive tasks, and it is known to include DLPFC, insula,
IPL, thalamus, (pre-)SMA, dACC, and the cerebellum (Cabeza
and Nyberg, 2000; Fox et al., 2005; Owen et al., 2005; Kim et al.,
2010; for detailed hypothetical explanations of the functions of
observed regions in externally guided decision-making, see Mohr
et al., 2010a).
In contrast, the DMN consists mainly of cortical midline struc-
tures (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Raichle and Gusnard, 2005)
and comprisesMPFC,pACC,PCC,and superior temporal/inferior
parietal cortex (Fox et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2010;Qin and Northoff,
2011). The DMN is more active at rest than during externally ori-
ented cognitive tasks (Raichle et al., 2001; Buckner et al., 2008b).
The regions within DMN are known to show a high degree of
functional connectivity during rest (Raichle et al., 2001; Beck-
mann et al., 2005; Raichle and Snyder, 2007; Buckner et al., 2008a).
Interestingly, the DMN and task-positive network are temporally
anticorrelated such that task-induced activation within the task-
positive network is associated with attenuation of the DMN (Fox
et al., 2005, 2009). These physiological phenomena are thought
to reﬂect stimulus-independent thought (e.g., mind-wandering;
Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009), which has been stud-
ied since the 1960s from a naturalistic viewpoint (Singer and
Antrobus, 1962, 1963; Antrobus et al., 1966, 1970; Wollman and
Antrobus, 1986).
The DMN is also activated by a task that requires processing
internally generated information, including self-reference (Kel-
ley et al., 2002; Northoff et al., 2006), episodic memory retrieval
(Buckner et al., 2008b), envisioning the future (Szpunar et al.,
2007), mental imaginary (Hassabis et al., 2007; Daselaar et al.,
2010), and mentalizing (Gusnard et al., 2001; Amodio and Frith,
2006). Because of the long lists of psychological contents related to
the DMN, it is difﬁcult to attribute any speciﬁc psychological func-
tion to task-negative regions. TheDMN is often summarizedmore
physiologically as the reﬂection of intrinsic brain activity in the
context of neuroscience (for detailed reviews about task-positive
and DMN, see Broyd et al., 2009; Northoff et al., 2010).
Intrinsic brain activity during a resting state is known to affect
a stimulus-induced activity (Northoff et al., 2010). For instance,
Northoff et al. (2007) measured the level of g-aminobutyric acid
(GABA) in pACC, which is part of the DMN during a resting state
using magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS), in addition to the
blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response during an emo-
tion judgment task using fMRI. The resting-state level of GABA in
the pACC correlated with the degree of decreased BOLD response
in the same region induced by an emotional judgment task. This
study demonstrated that the resting-state concentration of GABA
in the pACC can indeed impact upon stimulus-induced activity
changes in the same region pACC.
Based on the rest–stimulus interaction and the overlap between
the network for internally guided decision-making with DMN,
internally guided decision-making seems to be based largely on
intrinsic brain activity.
Taken together, by linking with the notions about the DMN,
our meta-analysis results suggest that the decision in internally
guided decision-making is based largely on intrinsic brain activ-
ity within the DMN (see Figure 4 for schematic summary). This
implication from physiological evidence has high afﬁnity with
the psychological nature of internally guided decision-making:
decision in internally guided decision-making depends on the
participant’s own criteria rather than on circumstantial criteria.
Internally guided decision-making might be modulated directly
by intrinsic brain activity, which can be assessed according to the
resting-state brain activity.
THEORETICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXTERNALLY AND INTERNALLY
GUIDED DECISION-MAKING
Outcome-based regulation and conﬂict-based regulation
Is internally guided decision-making modulated solely by intrinsic
brain activity within the DMN? As described earlier in the review
part of this report, it is known that the outcomes and feedback are
used to regulate externally guided decision-making process (e.g.,
RL model) to avoid error decision. The outcome-based regulation
process is not applicable to internally guided decision-making that
does not presuppose the presence of outcomes and feedback (i.e.,
an objectively correct answer). Is there any regulatory process in
internally guided decision-making, as there is in externally guided
decision-making?
A possible regulatory process for internally guided decision-
making is conﬂict-based regulation instead of outcome-based
regulation in the case of externally guided decision-making (see
Figure 4). Conﬂict is deﬁned psychologically and computationally
as the simultaneous activation of incompatible representations
(Botvinick et al., 2001). The abilities of monitoring and regu-
lation of conﬂict have been investigated extensively in cognitive
psychology and neuroscience. Their emphases have been made
predominantly on the conﬂict between error and correct response
tendencies using tasks which strongly activate the error response
(e.g., Flanker task, Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2001; Takezawa
and Miyatani, 2005; Stroop task, Stroop, 1935; MacDonald et al.,
2000a; and Simon task, Masaki et al., 2007). Several neuroimaging
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studies have documented that greater dACC activation is observed
when participants are confronted with situations that demand
detection of conﬂict (MacDonald et al., 2000b;Milham et al., 2003;
Kerns et al., 2004; Egner and Hirsch, 2005), whereas the cognitive
regulation of conﬂict (e.g., attentional modulation) is apparently
related to the LPFC to reduce conﬂict (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004;
Kerns et al., 2004).
In addition to the conﬂict between error and correct response,
the dACC evaluates conﬂict that occurs during internally guided
decision-making (Greene et al., 2004; Forstmann et al., 2008;Knut-
son et al., 2008; Nakao et al., 2009a, 2010a,c; Sommer et al., 2010;
Caspers et al., 2011; Kahane et al., 2011). In these studies, the con-
ﬂict was manipulated based on the number of choices (Forstmann
et al., 2008), scenarios of types (Kahane et al., 2011), ratings for
each stimulus (Nakao et al., 2009a, 2010c), the chosen frequency
of each stimulus (Nakao et al., 2010a), or reaction times (Greene
et al., 2004; Knutson et al., 2008; Sommer et al., 2010; Caspers
et al., 2011). Irrespective of the mode of conﬂict manipulation,
higher dACC activities were observed in a large-conﬂict condi-
tion than in a small conﬂict condition during internally guided
decision-making in these studies. This evidence suggests that
dACC evaluates the conﬂict between possible decision branches
in internally guided decision-making.
The regulation process used to reduce conﬂict in internally
guided decision-making is probably different from that of exter-
nally guided decision-making (Lieberman and Eisenberger, 2005;
Nakao et al., 2009b, 2010a,c; Chen et al., 2010). Instead of LPFC
in the case of externally guided decision-making, MPFC and PCC
as the part of the DMN associate with reduction of the conﬂict.
Usingpsychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses of fMRIdata,
Chen et al. (2010) showed that the dACC co-varied signiﬁcantly
more highly with the DMPFC and PCC during a face preference
judgment task with no objective correct answer when compared
to the control task: a gender judgment task with one correct
answer. Similarly, Nakao et al. (2010c) reported that dACC has
functional connectivity withVMPFC only during an occupational
choice task, as internally guided decision-making, and not during
a word-length judgment task. These results suggest that the MPFC
and PCC as the parts of the DMN are modulated in response to
the amount of conﬂict evaluated within dACC to reduce conﬂict
during internally guided decision-making (Nakao et al., 2009b,
2010a,c).
One might argue that the dACC is not observed in our
meta-analysis results for internally guided decision-making,which
means that dACC does not function in internally guided decision-
making. As described above, the evaluation of conﬂict within
dACC works in situations with and without an objective correct
answer. Additionally, the function of dACC is not limited to evalu-
ationof conﬂict. It includes detectionof error (Garavan et al., 2003;
de Bruijn et al., 2009) and evaluation of the action value (Rush-
worth et al., 2007; Walton et al., 2007): dACC can be activated
during externally guided decision-making for these functions. For
these reasons,dACCactivationwas not shown in themeta-analysis
results for internally guided decision-making based on the previ-
ous studies’ contrasts of internal decision-making vs. a control task
with one objective correct answer without uncertainty (see review
part and Table A1 in “Appendix” for details of the contrasts). We
did not include the contrast of large-conﬂict vs. small conﬂict
in internally guided decision-making as well as results from PPI
analyses in our meta-analysis because these did not ﬁt our main
aim. However, regarding results from previous studies about con-
ﬂict evaluation during internally guided decision-making, conﬂict
is evaluated within dACC during internally guided decision-
making. The evaluated conﬂict affects the regulation process,
which differs from externally guided decision-making.
Taken together, instead of outcome-based regulation in exter-
nally guided decision-making, conﬂict-based regulation might
have an important role in internally guided decision-making. The
internally guided decision-making is probably based not only on
intrinsic brain activity within DMN but also on the dACC as the
part of task-positive network.
Modulation from attentional network in internally guided
decision-making
Internally guided decision-making, which is supported mainly
by the DMN, might also be modulated in anticorrelated way by
the network for attentional control. Corbetta et al. (2008) and
Corbetta and Shulman (2002) proposed that networks of two
types are involved in attending to environmental stimuli: a dorsal
frontoparietal network and a ventral frontoparietal network. The
dorsal frontoparietal network includes the dorsal parietal cortex
(particularly the intraparietal sulcus and superior parietal lobule)
and the dorsal frontal cortex (precentral sulcus and frontal eye
ﬁeld; see Figure 2 of Corbetta et al., 2008). The ventral frontopari-
etal network includes the temporoparietal junction and ventral
frontal cortex (i.e., middle frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus,
frontal operculum, and anterior insula). When focusing attention
on an object, the dorsal frontoparietal network is activated, but
the ventral frontoparietal network is deactivated. When an unex-
pected but important event is evoked, both attentional networks
are activated to reorient the attention.
Both of these networks consist mainly of lateral cortical regions
(i.e., task-positive network), and do not include the cortical mid-
line structure within the DMN, which is mainly observed in
internally guided decision-making. However, the activity within
the dorsal frontoparietal network is negatively correlated with the
DMN activity (Fox et al., 2005; Golland et al., 2007; Corbetta et al.,
2008). When the dorsal frontoparietal network is activated, the
DMN is deactivated, and vice versa. Such functional connectivity
was not observed between the ventral frontoparietal network and
the DMN (Corbetta et al., 2008). Although no study has inves-
tigated the role of the top-down attentional control in internally
guided decision-making, it is possible that the attentional network
affect to internally guided decision-making in an anticorrelated
way. For instance, when the dorsal frontoparietal network is acti-
vated and the ventral frontoparietal network is deactivated (i.e.,
when attention is focused on external stimuli), the processes for
internally guided decision-making are expected to be attenuated.
COMMONALITIES BETWEEN EXTERNALLY AND INTERNALLY GUIDED
DECISION-MAKING
Overlap between externally and internally guided decision-making
Our meta-analysis results showed that the DMPFC is activated
in externally guided decision-making under uncertainty, that in a
www.frontiersin.org March 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 31 | 13
Nakao et al. Internally guided decision-making
social situation, and internally guided decision-making. Psycho-
logically, this result suggests that the DMPFC is not modulated
solely by the uncertainty of outcome, social situation, or non-
availability of outcome, and that it has common functions in
decision-making of these kinds. Physiologically, our results sug-
gest that the DMPFC is co-activated both with DLPFC–insula–
thalamus–IPL and/or VMPFC–pACC–PCC–STG networks, and
that it has functional relations with these networks.
One might want to argue that the overlap within DMPFC
does not reﬂect that the area was activated both in externally and
internally guided decision-making, but the DMPFC was observed
because of the extended area from SMA (BA6) in externally guided
decision-making and the extended area fromVMPFC in internally
guided decision-making. That is, the DMPFC observed in exter-
nally guided decision-making was caused by the activation within
SMA and using a spherical kernel of 10 mm radius in MKDA,
it was expanded to the DMPFC (BA8). In contrast, the DMPFC
observed in internally guided decision-making was caused by the
activity in VMPFC and by a spherical kernel, it was expanded to
the area DMPFC. However, as Figure 2 shows, the area observed in
internally guided decision-making was expanded to the posterior
part of the overlap. Furthermore, the overlapped area includes the
central part of DMPFC observed in externally guided decision-
making (see Figures 1A and 2A). Based on these observations, it is
implausible that the result of DMPFC was the overlap between the
edges of the spherical kernels. It would be reasonable to infer that
the overlapped area was activated consistently both in externally
and internally guided decision-making.
Another possible confounding factor reﬂected in the overlap is
the task difﬁculty. It is possible that the experimental tasks in both
externally guided (i.e., uncertain condition) and internally guided
circumstances were more difﬁcult than the control tasks, and that
the difference of difﬁculty was reﬂected in the DMPFC activation
both in externally and internally guided decision-making. How-
ever, to assess the effect of the difference of task difﬁculty between
experimental and control conditions, we examined the reaction
time difference between these conditions. Results show no signif-
icant difference either in externally guided or in internally guided
decision-making. The overlap within DMPFC is not expected to
reﬂect the difference of task difﬁculty between experimental and
control tasks.
Although the speciﬁc function of the DMPFC remains unclear,
one possible role suggested by our result is that it integrates sig-
nals from task-positive regions and/or task-negative regions to bias
either choice of behavior (see Figure 4), which was also proposed
in previous articles (Volz et al., 2006;Nakao et al., 2009b). Depend-
ing on whether an objective correct answer is available or not, the
DLPFC–insula–thalamus–IPL network or VMPFC–pACC–PCC–
STG network is strongly activated. However, irrespective of which
network is strongly activated, the DMPFC would receive the sig-
nals from the activated network(s), then integrate and mediate
these signals to the motor control regions to output. In fact, the
DMPFC has a strong connection with motor areas (Averbeck and
Seo, 2008).
Ochsner et al. (2004) and Ochsner and Gross (2005) reported
that the DMPFC was associated with different forms of cog-
nitive control over emotional response. This fact suggests that
the DMPFC is the node point between cognition and emotion.
The DMPFC might be suited to integrate relevant cognitive and
emotional processes in externally and internally guided decision-
making. For that reason, it is involved in decision-making of both
types.
One might be surprised that only the DMPFC was overlapped
between these two types of decision-making tasks. One possible
reason for the small fraction of overlap is that the data used in
meta-analysis were already contrasted in previous studies. Both
in the externally guided decision-making under uncertainty and
internally guided decision-making, previous studies used a con-
trol task which required participants to make judgment in the
situation with an objective correct answer without uncertainty.
The brain regions which have functions in the control task were
not reﬂected in the results for externally guided decision-making
under uncertainty and internally guided decision-making. There-
fore, our results might show the small fraction of overlapping. For
example, the visual or auditory cortex for stimulus input, motor
area for response,anddACC for regulationprocess canbe activated
during the control task. The striatum, amygdala, and orbitofrontal
cortex for reward expectation can also be activated in the control
task with reward feedback (e.g., pure monetary rewards task in
Moll et al., 2006, and a gambling task using learned rules in Bhanji
et al., 2010). We should note that we cannot conclude that the
regions which were not observed in the meta-analysis have no
function in these decision-making processes.
Another possible reason for the limited overlap area is the
nature of MKDA. The MKDA (and other methods of meta-
analyses) shows only the consistently activated regions in each
category, although this is the aim of the meta-analysis. Conse-
quently, for example, even when one of the studies of internally
guided decision-making reported insula activity, such as that of
Johnson et al. (2005), it was not reﬂected in the result from MKDA
for internally guided decision-making. Therefore, although the
insula was observed in the results of MKDA for externally guided
decision-making, that region was not observed as a common
region between externally and internally guided decision-making.
Again, we should note carefully that the regions that were not
observed using MKDA are not equal to the regions which have no
function in decision-making. What we can know from the meta-
analysis is that the observed regions were observed consistently in
previous studies. This point is explained further in the following
section.
Relation between externally and internally guided decision-making
In this report, to examine internally guided decision-making
speciﬁcally as distinguished from externally guided decision-
making,we categorized decision-making into externally and inter-
nally guided decision-making conceptually and methodologically.
Consequently, we showed a difference of neural networks between
these two. These two neural networks are, however, thought to
be not completely independent of each other. They are merely
the two extremes of a single continuum (see Figure 4). Each
decision-making task can be located on the continuum, and the
extent to which the DLPFC–insula–thalamus–IPL or theVMPFC–
pACC–PCC–STG networks become involved is expected to differ
depending on the decision-making situation.
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In fact, several studies included in externally guided decision-
making have shown activation within the network for internally
guided decision-making (e.g., VMPFC, Elliott et al., 1999; Callan
et al., 2009; PCC, Coricelli and Nagel, 2009; STG, Elliott et al.,
1999; Elliott et al., 2006; Coricelli and Nagel, 2009; and vice versa
DLPFC, Johnson et al., 2005; Greene and Paxton, 2009; Schleim
et al., 2011; insula, Johnson et al., 2005; IPL, Chen et al., 2010).
In addition, Pearson et al. (2011) reviewed mainly monkey single-
neuron recording studies and implicated PCC as the part of DMN
which has a role in externally guided decision-making. The clear
distinctive neural substrates were observed in our meta-analysis
because the results of meta-analysis show only the consistently
activated regions in each category. This feature functioned well to
reveal regions associated with the two extreme categories. How-
ever, non-activated regions from MKDA analysis are not equal to
non-participating regions in each category of decision-making.
When participants refer to criteria that are probably used pre-
dominantly in internally guided decision-making, the VMPFC–
pACC–PCC–STG network was activated even in externally guided
decision-making. For instance, Hampton et al. (2008) reported
increased VMPFC and STG activities during externally guided
decision-making in a social situation when they used a compu-
tational model incorporating referencing process of one’s own
actions to analyze fMRI data (see the review section for additional
details). Furthermore, Goel and Dolan (2003) used a deduc-
tive reasoning task (e.g., “No harmful substances are natural; All
poisons are natural; ∴ No poisons are harmful”. . . true, false,
or unsure) with one objective correct answer. They observed
increased VMPFC activity when participants reached a decision
based on their internal beliefs about the world (e.g., false response
for “No poisons are harmful” based on the belief that “Poisons
are harmful”) instead of logical reasoning (e.g., true response for
“No poisons are harmful”). Even in the case of externally guided
decision-making, the network that functions predominantly for
internally guided decision-making is activated to some degree
depending on the task type and the participant’s strategy.
Taken together, although one might wish to distinguish
decision-making as two completely different phenomena – exter-
nally guided or internally guided – such a distinction between
networks of the two types becomes relevant based on those earlier
studies. How these two networks interact and how they are inte-
grated during real-life decision-making remains to be resolved.
However, our meta-analysis results at least suggest that two com-
plementary networks are involved in decision-making and that the
DMPFC serves some role in the integrative process.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Our meta-analysis revealed that the neural network used predom-
inantly for internally guided decision-making differs from that for
externally guided decision-making under uncertainty. This result
suggests that studying only externally guided decision-making
under uncertainty is insufﬁcient to account for decision-making
processes that take place in a human brain. It is necessary to exam-
ine internally guided decision-making more speciﬁcally to eluci-
date the psychological and neuralmechanisms of humandecision-
making comprehensively. Furthermore, it would be beneﬁcial
to investigate how the two neural substrates for internally and
externally guideddecision-makingmutually interact in day-to-day
decision-making situations.
Based on the discussion presented above, we propose two pos-
sible directions to investigate internally guided decision-making:
rest–stimulus interaction and conﬂict-based regulation.
Rest–stimulus interaction
The network for internally guided decision-making overlapped
with the DMN. This fact implies that internally guided decision-
making is strongly affected by resting-state brain activities. Inves-
tigating how the resting state affects the decision-making process
(i.e., rest–stimulus interaction in decision-making) is a key direc-
tive leading to understanding of internally guided decision-
making. The number of studies investigating the rest–stimulus
interactions is growing (Greicius and Menon, 2004; Boly et al.,
2007; Northoff et al., 2007, 2010; Wiebking et al., 2010, 2011;
Duncan et al., 2011). Using the methods in those earlier stud-
ies, further detailed neuronal characteristics of internally guided
decision-making would be revealed.
For example, the resting-state EEG for several minutes before
conducting experimental tasks can be used to investigate the effect
from intrinsic brain activity to internally guided decision-making.
As decision-making tasks, color-similarity judgment and color
preference judgment taskswhichwere used in Johnson et al. (2005)
are expected to be useful for this purpose (similar tasks were also
used by Goldberg and Podell, 1999, 2000). In both tasks, three
colored squares are presented in each trial. The colored square
presented in the upper center is the target color, and the squares
presented in the lower left and right are choices. In the color-
similarity judgment task, participants are asked to judge which
choice is more similar to the target color (“Which is more sim-
ilar?”). In the color preference judgment task, participants were
asked to judge which color pair (target–choice pair) they prefer
(“Which do you prefer?”).
If intrinsic brain activity modulates internally guided decision-
making, then the following is expected. Especially in participants
who showed more increased resting-state activity (i.e., higher
power spectral density during resting state), the color preference
judgments are less biased from properties of external stimulus
(e.g., color similarity; similar and dissimilar pairs are almost
equally selected as the preferred pairs in those participants). In
other words, participants who showed higher resting-state activity
are expected to rely less on the properties of external stimulus for
their preference judgment but might rely greatly on their internal
criteria. In the color-similarity judgment, such a relationwouldnot
be observed even in caseswhere the judgment is difﬁcult because of
the similar color choices: the color-similarity judgment is the task
of making a judgment based on the external stimulus properties.
It is expected to be less affected by the intrinsic brain activity.
Conﬂict-based regulation
Regarding internally guided decision-making, outcomes and feed-
back are not available to adjust decision-making processes as
externally guided decision-making. For that reason, outcome-
based learning and regulation are not applicable to internally
guided decision-making. Instead, previous results of studies have
suggested that the amount of conﬂict is evaluated within dACC
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during internally guided decision-making (Greene et al., 2004;
Forstmann et al., 2008; Knutson et al., 2008; Nakao et al., 2009a,
2010a,c; Sommer et al., 2010; Caspers et al., 2011; Kahane et al.,
2011), and the signal from dACC is expected to regulate activation
within DMN during internally guided decision-making (Chen
et al., 2010; Nakao et al., 2010c). Details of conﬂict-based regu-
lation processes in internally guided decision-making, however,
might be less readily apparent. For instance, learning and regula-
tion processes of what kinds are achieved to reduce conﬂict during
internally guided decision-making remains unclear.
Several options are related to manipulation of conﬂict during
internally guided decision-making: stimulus-based manipulation
by the number of choices (Forstmann et al., 2008) or type of sce-
nario (Kahane et al., 2011), and individualizedmanipulation based
on reaction time (Greene et al., 2004; Knutson et al., 2008; Som-
mer et al., 2010; Caspers et al., 2011), ratings (Nakao et al., 2009a,
2010c; Jarcho et al., 2011), or chosen frequency of each stimu-
lus (Nakao et al., 2010a). Although each manipulation has strong
and weak points, all are applicable to internally and externally
guided decision-making. These methods are useful to investi-
gate the differences of conﬂict-based regulation process between
decision-making of the two kinds.
To measure brain activities relating to conﬂict-based regula-
tion process, not only fMRI but also event-related brain potentials
(ERPs) are useful. The amplitudes of correct and conﬂict-related
negativity (CRN; Simon-Thomas and Knight, 2005; Masaki et al.,
2007; Nakao et al., 2010a) and N2 components (Yeung et al., 2004;
Bartholow et al., 2005) are known to reﬂect the amount of conﬂict.
Nakao et al. (2010a) reported that the amount of conﬂict during
internally guided decision-making (occupational choice in their
case) is also reﬂected in the amplitude of the CRN.
LIMITATIONS
The meta-analysis results showed clearly that the activation of
DMPFC and IFG occurred consistently in externally guided
decision-making in social situations, and DMPFC was shared with
internally guided decision-making. However, because of limita-
tions imposed by insufﬁcient studies of externally guided decision-
making in a social situation, we were unable to compare that
directly with internally guided decision-making. Replication of
the current results when a more extensive and balanced selection
of studies becomes available might therefore be warranted.
In the present study, externally guided decision-making under
uncertainty has subcategories of two types (see review part and
TableA1 inAppendix):we include the studiesmanipulatinguncer-
tainty by theprobabilistic outcomeandby theperceptual difﬁculty.
One might argue that perceptual difﬁculty is different from the
probabilistic outcome and that these two types should be sep-
arated. We included studies using perceptual difﬁculty for the
following reasons. First, previous studies (Grinband et al., 2006;
Callan et al., 2009; Banko et al., 2011) used the concept of uncer-
tainty to describe the psychological state manipulated by percep-
tual difﬁculty. Second, our conceptual and operational deﬁnitions
of uncertainty did not have a positive reason to exclude studies
using perceptual difﬁculty. Third, as we described in the review
part, the studies of the two subcategories of externally guided
FIGURE 5 |The MKDA results for (A) externally guided decision-making
under uncertainty using a probabilistic outcome, (B) internally guided
decision-making using moral judgment. Results from the different
statistical thresholds are shown with different colors: cyan, pink, and yellow, a
height threshold of familywise error rate (FWE) corrected at p <0.05; light
blue, a stringent threshold of FWE corrected for the spatial extent at p<0.05
with primary thresholds of uncorrected p <0.001; blue, violet, and red, a
medium threshold of FWE corrected for the spatial extent at p<0.05 with
primary thresholds of uncorrected p<0.01. No clusters were identiﬁed at the
stringent threshold in preference judgment. DMPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; SPL,
superior parietal lobule; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; pACC, perigenual anterior
cingulate cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; MPFC, medial prefrontal
cortex; STG, superior temporal gyrus.
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decision-making under uncertainty reported similar neural sub-
strates. Indeed, when we conduct meta-analysis using the studies
of probabilistic outcome (see Figure 5A; Table 4), similar results
to those obtained from the meta-analysis using the studies of
both subcategories were observed (see Figure 1A; Table 2): we
were unable to conduct a meta-analysis that includes studies of
perceptual difﬁculty because of the scarcity of such studies (four
studies). Furthermore, our results for externally guided decision-
making under uncertainty closely resembled those of a previous
meta-analysis study (Mohr et al., 2010a). Based on these reasons,
we assume that including these two subcategories into externally
guided decision-making was less problematic for our purpose
of comparing externally and internally guided decision-making.
However, these two types of externally guided decision-making
can be supported by different neural substrates. This possibil-
ity should be addressed when sufﬁcient numbers of studies for
meta-analysis become available.
Similarly, we included two types of decision-making as inter-
nally guided decision-making (i.e., moral and preference deci-
sions), based on our conceptual and operational deﬁnitions and
similarity of neural substrates between these two types of stud-
ies. Although meta-analysis for preference judgment showed no
signiﬁcant regions because of the paucity of studies (seven stud-
ies), meta-analysis for moral judgment (see Figure 5B; Table 4)
showed similar neural substrates to those found in the meta-
analysis results for decision-making of these two types (see
Figure 1C; Table 2). Based on these results, we assume here
that using both moral and preference decision-making as inter-
nally guided decision-making is less problematic for our purposes.
However, it is possible that these subcategories present several dif-
ferences of neural substrates because the preference judgment
can be less inﬂuenced by social pressure than moral decision-
making. In addition, different types of preference judgment (i.e.,
preference for color or for occupation) can be made based
on different kinds of psychological criteria, and can be corre-
lated with different neural substrates. It would be interesting to
compare the neural substrates of these subcategories in future
studies.
Because coordinate-based meta-analytical methods such as
MKDA are based on spatial coordinates from neuroimaging data,
they have been limited to PET and fMRI studies, and excluded
EEG/ERP studies. Additionally, we did not include results from
the analysis related to functional connectivity and computational
model-based analysis into our meta-analysis. Although we tried
to refer to studies of these kinds in review and discussion parts of
this presentation,wenote that ourmeta-analysis results reﬂect lim-
ited aspects of brain activities in externally and internally guided
decision-making.
CONCLUSION
We compared different types of decision-making: externally
and internally guided decision-making. Based on experimental–
operational and neural differences, we can distinguish these
two basic types of decision-making from one another. Exter-
nally guided decision-making in situations with only one
less-predictable correct answer was mainly supported by
the DLPFC–insula–thalamus–IPL networks. Internally guided
decision-making in which no correct answer based on
Table 4 | MKDA results for each sub-type of decision-making study
Types of decision-making Region BA MNI coordinates Voxels Maxstat.
x y z
Externally guided (Uncertainty),
probabilistic outcome
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) 8 4 26 48 164 0.4**
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 9, 6, 8 40 22 40 960 0.26
†
Insula 47, 13 36 20 2 73 0.4**
Inferior parietal lobule (IPL) 40 −48 −50 44 811 0.21†
40 46 −54 44 100 0.35**
IPL, Superior Parietal Lobule (SPL), Precuneus 40, 39, 7, 19 12 38 −54 3086 0.26*
Internally guided, moral judgment Medial prefrontal cortex 10 6 56 0 16 0.36**
(MPFC)
10, 11, 9 −4 52 0 1647 0.32†
Perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (pACC) 32 −10 46 −8 20 0.4**
Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) 23 −2 −54 24 23 0.36**
31 −6 −56 30 16 0.33**
Superior temporal gyrus (STG) 39 −50 -62 20 38 0.37**
Because of low numbers of studies (four studies), we did not conduct meta-analysis for externally guided decision-making under uncertainty using perceptual difﬁculty.
Internally guided decision-making using preference judgment showed no signiﬁcant region because of the low number of studies (seven studies).
Regions marked ** were signiﬁcant at FWE voxel-level corrected p<0.05 with extent size>10 voxels. Regions marked* were signiﬁcant at FEW extent corrected
p<0.05 at primary voxel thresholds of uncorrected p<0.001. Regions marked †were signiﬁcant at FEW extent corrected p<0.05 at primary voxel thresholds of
uncorrected p<0.01. Regions marked with* and with †were reported if these were additional regions.
BA denotes Brodman Area; Maxstat. denotes maximum of the Z ﬁeld.
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external circumstances is available, was supported by the
VMPFC–pACC–PCC–STG network. Although the psychological
and neural substrates of externally guided decision-making have
been well identiﬁed, they remain unclear in the case of internally
guided decision-making. This study of the substrates is of great
interest to the ﬁeld of decision-making itself in that it sheds some
light on a form of decision-making that is prevalent in actual
daily life. Beyond the ﬁeld of decision-making, this line of inves-
tigation is also expected to contribute to improvement in our
understanding of the function of the brain’s resting state and its
high activity, especially in the DMN that largely overlaps with
observed regions in internally guided decision-making.
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